THE MANY FACES OF WAR
March 13th, 2007The Baker Hamilton Report on Iraq is out. Not surprisingly it says Iraq is messed up and that our current strategy is not working. We paid for that finding? Not really, the report goes into details on how to engage the warring factions in the country and in the region to broker greater stability in the Middle East. I tend to agree with the big picture points made in the report. Though the greater problems in the Middle East are not directly related to the problems in Iraq, the area is so tense that the whole region could snap. Democracy won’t bloom in Iraq unless the larger tensions in the Middle East are addressed.
The more right-leaning partisans of our political spectrum have called the Iraq Study Group’s report the “cut and run” report. Other groups have called it “the blueprint of our surrender”. I have yet to hear alternatives other than to “stay the course” or to increase the number of troops. The “stay the course” proponents have to be smoking something for the ship is nowhere near port and it may be running out of gas. But what about more troops, will force work?
John McCain, the Senator from Arizona has called for more force. I have a lot of respect for the Senator. I will stand by any leader that has the courage of his convictions. Though I stand by Senator McCain’s integrity and courage I believe he is wrong on the issue of more force being the answer to Iraq’s woes. The whole theory of war boils down to what force can deliver.
The theory of war is to eliminate the capacity and will of your enemy to make war. There may be other reasons to pick up arms such as to liberate, stop genocide, gain resources, take wealth, or the increase one’s power, but these purposes of war are secondary. First and foremost, there is no gain unless the enemy’s capacity and will to make war (or in many cases to fight back) are eliminated. This is the theory of war, but reality is much different.
Germany was in rubble, there was no capacity to make war and little will, but still the Russians had to fight in the streets of Berlin and be kicking at the door of Hitler’s bunker before the war in the European Theater was over. Japan was burned to the ground and it took two atom bombs to convince the Emperor to quit; most of his advisors were for continuing the fight. Total war has to create such massive destruction that the leadership on one side or the other is eliminated and wiser people fill in the void.
There are no politics in total war. Countries chose sides and nothing counts but victory. In WW II, Italy and Japan were not about to pull their support for Germany because of the ruthless bombing of London. The British, French, Canadians, Australians, and Russians had no qualms about the fire bombing of Germany. In total war there is no political component to force.
Korea started to muddle the purity of military strategy. If the Korean War was 100 percent military strategy we would have invaded China, nuked any resistance and had WWIII. Korea put politics into the formula for war. Korea was about 80 percent military and 20 percent politics. The 80 percent military aspect of the war was to achieve the clear military objective of pushing the communists back to the 38th parallel. Beyond that objective, what China and the Soviet Union might do in response to further military objectives mattered.
The cold war was about 50-50 military and political, and the military part was show; it was military power that was not to be used. The free world gathered its allies and surrogates and the Soviet Union did the same. The result was not a breaking of wills but an escalating stalemate that broke the economy of the Soviet Union.
Viet Nam ushered in the era of conflict that is about 80 percent political and 20 percent military. Warfare today follows the same 80-20 rule. This means that victory depends as much on our diplomatic might as our military power. Enemies really don’t care about our smart bombs, satellites, supersonic aircraft or our aircraft carriers. High tech provides little defense against improvised explosive devices (IEDs), snipers, and terrorists. To conquer today’s enemies of peace and prosperity we need intelligence and allies in the villages where the bad guys hide.
This brings us to the issue of Iraq and increasing our troop forces. More force would quiet down the insurgency which would give the government of Iraq some breathing room. But does the force solve the problem; will more force eliminate IEDs and snipers? Will terrorists evaporate under the show of force? Will sectarian differences be calmed by the rule of democracy? Will the corruption in the Iraqi government and security forces be eliminated? Will opposing voices be heard and respected in open debate? Will force derail the growing political power of Hezbollah, Hamas, The Taliban, and will our troops end the shenanigans of Syria and Iran?
The answer to these questions is no. More force will give radicals more political power. Hezbollah and Hamas are already gaining political power by citing our policies. Even the Taliban are finding political allies. Force alone won’t eliminate the enemy’s will or capacity to make war.
There is an enormous political component to the civil war in Iraq and the overall tensions in the Middle East. Deep down the vast majority of the people of Iraq and the Middle East desire the ideals that our troops are sacrificing themselves to instill, but to succeed we must address the problems listed above. These are problems that force alone won’t solve. The Baker Hamilton report recognizes that politics and diplomacy, as well as power will determine the outcome of the powder keg of the Middle East.
We must not throw in the towel on our military power. Any combatant that thinks we are weak and won’t use force should be forcefully reminded of our resolve. On the same token, if we believe there is no power in upholding our high ideals we will become weak. If we believe that diplomatic prestige is tantamount to surrender then we will pay the piper soon enough.
Copyright: American-ideal.com - 2006
